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Ehrlich’s Legacies: 
Back to the Future 
in the Sociology of Law?
DAVID NELKEN
Social research on law has been characterised by a repeated discovery of the 
other hemisphere of the legal world. This rediscovery is often associated with 
Ehrlich.1
INTRODUCTION
What is meant by ‘re-considering’ Ehrlich—and why should we want to? In this chapter, I shall be discussing this question in relation to the influence Ehrlich’s work has had on later 
 writers—what can be called Ehrlich’s legacy—or, as we shall see, legacies.2 
I shall first contrast two reasons for studying classical writers. I will then go 
on to provide examples of the ways in which Ehrlich’s writings have been 
used by later scholars in the light of changing conditions and perspectives. 
In order to show how his work has served as a point of reference to deal 
with problems in the sociology of law, I describe how Ehrlich continues to 
inspire research into the evolving phenomena of the ‘living law’. Then, as 
an illustration of the way in which scholars try to update his ideas so as to 
make them relevant as theory advances, I discuss the way he is currently 
being re-read and re-written in the light of Luhmann’s social theory of law. 
1 M Galanter, ‘Justice in many rooms: Courts, private ordering and indigenous law’ (1981) 
19 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1 at 20.
2 This will necessarily be a selective overview of the influence of some of Ehrlich’s key ideas 
about law in society, and will not touch, for example, on the influence or implications of his 
arguments about free law-finding. Even so, following up their influence will take us across a 
range of interdisciplinary approaches to law, including comparative law, international law, 
conflicts of law, legal philosophy, law and economics, and social theory. For a brief previous 
effort to show Ehrlich’s influence in different disciplines see KA Ziegert, ‘A Note on Eugen 
Ehrlich and the Production of Legal Knowledge’ (1998) Sydney Law Review 4–17.
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I conclude by suggesting that the process of interpreting the message of a 
‘founding father’ is never ending. Without pretending that we can find in 
Ehrlich’s work ready-made answers to our current challenges, I do hope to 
show why the questions he asked are still of contemporary relevance.
WHY STUDY A CLASSICAL AUTHOR? CONTEXTUALISATION, 
DE-CONTEXTUALISATION AND RE-CONTEXTUALISATION
Why should we still be interested in Ehrlich’s controversial philosophical, 
historical, psychological or sociological propositions? There are many rea-
sons to be concerned with the work of great writers of the past, but for our 
purposes it is helpful to contrast the aim of seeking to get a writer’s ideas 
right with that of trying to decide whether the ideas themselves were right. 
These certainly seem like relatively distinct exercises. Put most sharply, the 
first of these approaches could be said to aim at adding to the footnotes on 
Ehrlich, while the second focuses on the way in which Ehrlich figures as a 
footnote in the work of later writers. 
The importance of context varies for the two enquiries. For the first 
approach it is of the essence to understand Ehrlich in his time and place. 
We might, for example, try to explain how a scholar of Roman law could 
have come to make this sort of breakthrough to sociological fieldwork, or 
examine the similarities and differences between his idea of living law and 
the ideas about ‘social law’ in the work of earlier writers such as Savigny or 
Tonnies. In the second type of enquiry, however, our interest is more about 
what has been made of a scholar’s ideas—and on what can still be made of 
them. So the point would be more the need to get Ehrlich ‘out of context’ 
in the sense of describing how his work has been (or can be) made to tran-
scend his setting in Bukovina at the beginning of the twentieth century.3 If, 
in the one case, we would engage in careful exegesis in order to grasp what 
Ehrlich meant, in the other we would be more concerned with showing 
what Ehrlich means for us today. 
In practice, however, although there are important differences in empha-
sis, these enquiries cannot entirely be kept apart. Even if our research is 
focused on the way in which Ehrlich’s work influenced later authors, we 
will still need to engage in some exegesis of what he actually said. It would 
be question-begging to speak of Ehrlich’s influence unless we can be sure 
that the ideas used by others are those actually espoused by Ehrlich. In fact, 
writers who try to get Ehrlich right are frequently motivated by the desire 
to show that the way in which other commentators have got him wrong is 
3 This is over-simplifying. It could be argued—it has been argued—that it was the marginal-
ity of Ehrlich’s context—‘on the periphery’ of the Austro-Habsburg empire—that enabled him 
to see ‘more’ than his contemporaries.
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not merely a matter of mere antiquarian interest. Thus, in an earlier paper, 
I devoted considerable attention to distinguishing Ehrlich’s ideas from the 
ways in which they had been re-presented by Roscoe Pound.4 However, at 
the same time, I also argued that the reason why this mattered was that 
Pound’s summary obscured the way in which Ehrlich’s contribution could 
still be of value for us. Clearing up the misconceptions about what Ehrlich 
was supposed to have argued was therefore a prerequisite to going on to 
reveal the relevance of what he actually said for current debates. As I shall 
seek to show later, a return to the text not only—typically—accompanies 
the claim to have uncovered the ‘true’ or ‘real’ historical Ehrlich, it can 
also serve as a take-off point when searching for new meaning in older 
texts.
Our interest in relating Ehrlich to his context will also depend on our 
conception of how the sociology of law progresses. On one (scientistic?) 
view of sociology of law as a ‘science’, our prime task is to subject Ehrlich’s 
de-contextualised hypotheses to empirical testing. To contextualise him 
involves making an imaginative leap back before not only the birth of the 
discipline of sociology of law, but also before there were studies of ‘law 
and psychology’ or ‘law and economics’. Ehrlich’s contribution would then 
have to be considered as of mainly historical interest on a par with other 
writings in the sciences of his period. If the sociology of law can ‘progress’ 
scientifically, or rather, just because it can progress, we should not expect 
the founder of the discipline to do more than set out directions to follow. 
We can learn from Ehrlich only by leaving him behind. 
However, most writers (including major textbook writers such as Treves 
or Cotterrell) see the sociology of law as less assimilable to this idea of 
scientific progress.5 They would encourage us to return to Ehrlich, as to 
other founding fathers, such as Durkheim, Weber or Marx, less because 
of the empirical validity of their specific claims and more because of the 
continuing relevance of the fundamental issues they dealt with and the way 
in which they dealt with them. On this view, Ehrlich’s arguments, as also 
the criticisms made of them at the time, may be as relevant today as they 
were then. The earliest reviewers of his work wondered about the relation-
ship between legal sociology and legal history,6 but the issue of disciplinary 
boundaries is as problematic now as it was then. Critics complained about 
Ehrlich using the term ‘law’ in talking of living law—most notably in 
Kelsen’s controversial attack on what he saw as Ehrlich’s failure to defend 
the rights of citizens as declared by state law.7 Furthermore, there are still 
4 D Nelken, ‘Law in Action or Living Law? Back to the Beginning in Sociology of Law’ 
(1984) 4 Legal Studies 157.
5 See, eg L Friedman, ‘The Law and Society Movement’ (1986) Stanford Law Review 763–80.
6 P Vinogradoff, ‘The Crisis of Modern Jurisprudence’ (1920) 29 Yale Law Journal 312–20.
7 See ch 6 of this volume.
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heated debates about the normative implications, if any, of claiming that 
societies are characterised by regimes of legal pluralism.8
Even where Ehrlich gets things ‘wrong’, this can be instructive. Many of 
the early comments, both on the original German edition and on the later 
American translation, echo those still being made today. Max Rheinstein, 
a hard though not unsympathetic critic, applauded Ehrlich for opening 
jurists’ eyes to the relations that actually exist between family members, the 
way in which wealth is actually transferred from the dead to the living, and 
how people actually buy and sell. However, he also accused him of peddling 
half truths. He considered it a (politically motivated!) mistake to describe 
custom as law; social behaviour patterns do not always coincide with what 
people really believe are the right values. It was important to see that law 
does make space for other normative systems, which it may then incorpo-
rate. However, it was wrong to treat this as the general rule. Ehrlich’s argu-
ments applied mainly, Rheinstein claimed, to what can be called ‘stop gap 
law’, the rules people make for themselves in private transactions. In terms 
of legal practice, he argued, it was misleading to reduce legal science to 
sociology. In addition, whilst legal sociology can be of assistance to judges, 
questions of justice involve matters of political prudence which do not and 
often should not be resolved by appealing to popular sentiment.9
The philosopher and jurist Morris Cohen, for his part, thought Ehrlich 
was overreacting against the historical school.10 He too criticised Ehrlich 
for confusing law with custom. The practice of tipping waiters, he pointed 
out, is custom not law, and there is nothing to be gained by calling it law. 
By contrast, the arcane details of wills are law—and not custom. Businesses 
may make their own agreements irrespective of the law, but they always act 
(in his prescient words) in its shadow. The state may not dictate everyday 
life, but its importance should never be underestimated. It would other-
wise be difficult to understand why such hard battles are fought over who 
should control the government.11
The fact that many of the issues raised by his work still do not seem to 
have found agreed solutions shows how far Ehrlich’s ideas do transcend 
their original context. Nonetheless, it is important to see that any ‘return’ 
to Ehrlich also involves a process of re-contextualisation. Later writers give 
new meaning to older authors as they ‘appropriate’ classical texts so as to 
make them speak to and for present purposes. Furthermore, it is this use 
which makes them classics in the same way that ‘traditions’ enable ‘the past 
 8 See, eg later in this chapter, the arguments Michaels deployed against Teubner and others.
 9 M Rheinstein, ‘Sociology of law, Apropos Moll’s translation of Eugen Ehrlich’s 
Grundlegung der soziologie des Rechts’ (1938) 48 Journal of Ethics 232–9.
10 MR Cohen, ‘Recent philosophical-legal literature in French, German, and Italian’ (1912–14)
26 International Journal of Ethics 528–46 at 535–7.
11 MR Cohen, ‘On Absolutisms in Legal Thought’ (1936) 84 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 681–715 at 684.
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to live in the present’.12 Even if we were to set out only to repeat exactly 
what Ehrlich is thought to have said, introducing his ideas can have different 
‘meaning’ depending on the changing context in which he is quoted. They 
would, for example, likely have a different impact at a time when there is 
concern about too much state intervention or ‘juridification’, as compared 
to a period of extensive privatisation. However, most returns to classical 
authors in any case, to a greater or lesser extent, also involve explicit 
attempts at (re)interpretations. Since any interpretation of what a past 
writer has written is contestable, other commentators will often allege that 
the new interpretation represents a departure from the correct meaning—
and it is through such debates that traditions develop and earlier scholars’ 
arguments are given new life. 
A given response to Ehrlich often tells us as much if not more about 
the interpreter than it does about what is being interpreted. Rheinstein, 
for example, thought Ehrlich’s arguments were vitiated by their political 
sub-text. The desire to legitimate only the kind of law that was popularly 
accepted—what he described as the ‘postulate of complete and homog-
enous democracy’—was being disguised as science. For him: 
Ehrlich’s basic proposition that the norms of law are nothing but the actual cus-
toms and habits of the people does not withstand the scrutiny of methodological 
analysis. It is the statement not of a scientific truth but of a political postulate. 
Nevertheless, Ehrlich’s work occupies a high rank in legal sociology.13
By contrast, Maoist writers in China (first introduced to Ehrlich’s sociology 
of law by Pound) wrote of ‘the reactionary essence of Ehrlich’s sociology of 
law’.14 In addition, as we shall see, Ehrlich’s ideas have been pressed into 
service both within a framework of Pound’s common-law cultural presup-
positions and projects, and in terms of Luhmann’s continental and civil law 
assumptions.
This raises the question of what yardstick to use in order to decide 
whether the work of an earlier writer has been interpreted (or misinter-
preted) to such an extent as not to deserve to count as an example of his 
or her influence. It would have been possible, as in my earlier discussion of 
Pound on Ehrlich, to write this chapter in the form of a protest at the way 
in which Ehrlich continues to be ‘appropriated’ by later scholars in ways 
that often pay scant attention to what he really said. As we shall have cause 
to note, there is indeed more than a little special pleading in the more recent 
accounts of Ehrlich offered by leading authors such as Alex Ziegert (again) 
or Gunther Teubner. However, my main purpose in this revisiting of Ehrlich 
12 M Krygier, ‘Law as Tradition’ (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 237–62.
13 Rheinstein, above n 9, 238–9.
14 JW Dong, ‘Sociology of law in China: Overview and trends’ (1989) 23 Law and Society 
Review 5 at 903–14 at 904.
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is not to try, yet again, to ‘save’ Ehrlich from his interpreters by offering 
a better reading of his text. If we are concerned with the usefulness of 
Ehrlich’s contribution to the discipline, we need also to ask questions about 
which interpretations have more heuristic value. However, once we do this, 
to insist that we are only interested in setting the record ‘straight’ about 
what Ehrlich actually said smacks not only of pedantry, but ingenuity.
If the meaning of an author is inevitably subject to different interpreta-
tions, the search for the most useful interpretation will often tread a fine 
line between misinterpretation and creative reinterpretation. Questions 
about interpretation can arise not only where scholars claim to be explain-
ing what Ehrlich really meant, but also where they argue that he got things 
wrong. And they of course also apply to our efforts to ‘correctly’ interpret 
Ehrlich’s interpreters. So we need always to ask how any given interpreta-
tion becomes authoritative. This does not mean that any interpretation of 
Ehrlich is as good as any other. There must be some limits to how far we are 
entitled to rewrite past thinkers in the light of current concerns. However, it 
does suggest that the heuristic value of an interpretation may change from 
one context of time and place to another. 
I may have been justified in trying to prise Ehrlich away from the embrace 
of Pound’s socio-legal engineering if, at the time I wrote, such an interpreta-
tion of his work was as serving as a block on the development of sociology 
of law. However, that still leaves open the question of whether Pound may 
have made ‘good’ use of Ehrlich in his own time. Under current conditions, 
it is arguable that attempts to re-read Ehrlich in the light of a major socio-
logical theorist of the range and sophistication of Niklas Luhmann should 
not be rejected tout court, even if, again, these interpretations do require 
some straining of Ehrlich’s prose. In other words, we also need to ask if 
reading Ehrlich’s work in the light of autopoietic theory of law as a commu-
nicative sub-system of society may be helpful in advancing the discipline. 
When dealing with Teubner’s recent reinterpretation of Ehrlich’s ideas in 
his influential paper about Global Bukowina,15 it would be inappropriate, 
for my purpose of understanding Ehrlich’s legacies, to concentrate only on 
the question of whether Teubner captures what Ehrlich meant at the time he 
wrote. We also need to see why his paper also represents a highly creative 
effort to apply Ehrlich’s ideas to new challenges in the light of new ways 
of theorising social change. Moreover, as we shall see when discussing his 
arguments in detail, the question of how we should respond to Teubner’s 
presentation of Ehrlich’s work becomes even more complicated because he 
admits that he is also changing the ideas that he has borrowed from him. As 
this, and the other examples I shall be presenting, will illustrate, efforts at 
15 G Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the world society’ in G Teubner (ed), 
Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997) 3–28.
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re-contextualisation produce an unstable compromise between the aims 
of contextualisation and de-contextualisation—between getting Ehrlich 
right and claiming that he is right.16
THREE ASPECTS OF LIVING LAW
The canonical definition of what is meant by ‘living law’ is usually taken to 
be Ehrlich’s statement that: 
The living law is the law which dominates life itself even though it has not been 
posited in legal propositions. The source of our knowledge of this law is, first, 
the modern legal document; secondly, direct observation of life, of commerce, 
of customs and usages and of all associations, not only those that the law has 
recognised but also of those that it has overlooked and passed by, indeed even of 
those that it has disapproved.17
However, this definition has some remarkable features. In the first place it 
is in large part mainly an indication of method. It tells us where to look 
(and how to look) for something, but the existence of that something is 
predicated on unspecified theoretical grounds. It is also difficult to see 
what his examples have in common other than the fact that they may all be 
illustrations of normative phenomena that elite lawyers in Vienna may not 
know about—or even want to know about. In any case, as is usual in the 
development of academic disciplines, what is presented by Ehrlich as one 
theoretical category is seen by later writers as grouping together a number 
of not necessarily homogenous phenomena. Following up the later recep-
tion of Ehrlich’s work in the relevant secondary literature, we will find that 
we have to deal with different legacies rather than assume that scholars 
have all taken the same message from what he wrote.
In his description of living law, Ehrlich puts together the creation or 
employment of law by lawyers (and others), the rules and usages of associa-
tions that are ‘recognised’ by or will develop into (state) law, as well as, most 
remarkably, the shared practices of associations that are disapproved of by 
the state and have no aspiration to be included in the sway of its law. Some 
later scholars who follow him have mainly shown interest in what else law 
does—the actual practice of legal officials, administrators as well as all those 
who use or are affected by the law. Others have focused more on what else 
does law, even to the extent of detecting the existence of rival legal systems. 
Finally, yet others are searching for the sources of normative order, what 
16 My 1984 paper on Ehrlich was no exception. In the final footnote, I proposed drawing 
on Ehrlich to construct a more ‘ecological’ approach to law reform (something which Gunther 
Teubner later asked me to elaborate on).
17 E Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, WL Moll (tr), with introduc-
tion by Roscoe Pound (New York, Russell and Russell, 1936/62) 493.
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Durkheim called ‘the pre-contractual basis of contract’.18 For the purposes of 
illustration, it may be helpful to distinguish developments in the study of law 
beyond the law (law other than that contained in statutes and judgments), 
law without the state (especially the co-existence of plural legal regimes) and 
order without law (the implicit norms that make order possible). 
There is certainly some overlap between the phenomena that are studied 
under each of these rubrics, and this goes beyond the common denomina-
tor that we cannot afford to restrict ourselves to the study of legal codes 
and court decisions if we want to understand ‘law in society’. However, 
there are also important differences in the issues that each of them raise. 
We may wonder how far Ehrlich was justified in combining into one cat-
egory examples such as youngsters giving over the pay for their work to 
their parents, and businessmen not insisting on being paid by their debtors. 
But the situation becomes even more complex when we seek to include as 
examples of living law an even greater variety of phenomena, including the 
avoidance of legal relations by automobile dealers, the alternative sanction-
ing mechanisms used by diamond merchants and the typical practices of 
queuing for the cinema.
The Law Beyond the Law
The first part of Ehrlich’s definition reminds us, as he would put it, that 
law ‘cannot imprisoned in a code’. We need to go ‘beyond’ the law books 
so as to take into account both the role of society in generating state law 
and judicial sentences and the way in which it shapes laws and decisions 
as they seek to influence social life. Ehrlich’s exemplar, the ‘modern legal 
document’, might not at first sight seem to be the most obvious starting 
point for grasping this aspect of living law. However, those who engage in 
the sociology of substantive areas of law certainly can learn a great deal 
from focusing on legal documents. Many of the books in the path-breaking 
‘law in context’ series (published in the United Kingdom from the 1960s 
onwards) did exactly this, gathering information about the contracts used 
by consulting engineers, or the standard-form contracts of hire purchase or 
dry cleaners, so as to reveal a world of law at variance with that presup-
posed by the more traditional textbooks. Giving attention to documents is 
also crucial to understanding the construction of transnational legal agree-
ments and regulatory modes by legal professionals.
It is impossible to trace the full influence of Ehrlich’s insights here—these 
are now woven into the warp and woof of sociology of law. Ehrlich’s claim 
that ‘the centre of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, nor 
in juristic science, nor in judicial decision, but in society itself’ could well 
18 E Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York, Free Press, 1964).
Ehrlich’s Legacies: Back to the Future in the Sociology of Law?  245
be taken as the leitmotiv of the contributions to the field by Lawrence 
Friedman, one of the most distinguished contemporary social historians of 
law. More generally, the argument that there is more to law than what can 
be found in statutes and court decisions is constitutive of any interdisciplin-
ary approach to law. All of the most famous studies over the last 50 years 
(mainly, it has to be said, coming from the United States), such as those by 
Macaulay ‘on the non-reliance on contracts’19 or Galanter ‘on why “the 
haves’ come out ahead”20 mainly concern the way in which non-legal fac-
tors shape the use of law. 
However, the idea that there is ‘law beyond the law’ has not always been 
taken in the same direction. Many have followed Pound and the Legal Realists 
in studying the ‘Law in action’ so as to explore the practical implementation 
of laws or of judicial and administrative decisions.21 But others have sought 
rather to understand the ‘legal consciousness’ of those who use or are affected 
by the law, showing how ideas of legality and what it represents circulate and 
shape such consciousness at least as much as they are its product.22 Marc 
Hertogh has recently sought to integrate Pound’s common law and Ehrlich’s 
more continental approach in order to investigate the interaction between 
law in action and legal consciousness. His case study of the use of discretion 
by housing officials shows how they mediate between the legal principle of 
formal equality enshrined in the Rechtsstaat and a wider popular legal con-
sciousness which values responsiveness and material equality.23
At the same time, the claim that law has more to do with its given local 
context than with the wider process of rule production in the legislature 
and courts has never been uncontroversial. As Rheinstein pointed out in 
an early appraisal of Ehrlich’s work,24 this is likely to vary by types of 
law. Later empirical research showed that forms of law, such as that to do 
with labour relations, did not necessarily correspond to particular forms of 
social organisation in ways that would be expected.25 There have also been 
some attempts to break out of the whole paradigm of trying to fit ‘law’ to 
19 S Macaulay, ‘Non-contractual relations in Business’ (1963) 28 American Sociological 
Review 55.
20 M Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change’ (1974) Law and Society Review 9 at 95–160.
21 The alleged equation between ‘law in action’ and ‘living law’ is examined critically in 
Nelken, above n 4.
22 S Silbey and P Ewick, The Common Place of Law (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1998); and S Silbey, ‘After Legal Consciousness’ (2005) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 323–68. 
23 M Hertogh, ‘A “European” Conception of Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering Eugen 
Ehrlich’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 457–81.
24 M Rheinstein, above n 9.
25 S Henry, Private Justice: Toward Integrated Theorizing in the Sociology of Law (London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); D Nelken, ‘Beyond the Study of “Law and Society”’ (1986) 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal 11.2 at 323–38; and G Iskowits, ‘Social Theory 
and Law: The Significance of Stuart Henry’ (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 949–62.
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‘society’.26 Most radically, Luhmann, first in his systems theory approach, 
and even more in his autopoietic social theory, insisted that law could only 
relate to its own communicative constructions of its environment rather 
than actually have direct connections with it. 
Legal historians and comparative lawyers have often stressed that law 
can be out of step with society, or be linked to foreign sources rather than 
being embedded in the society in which it is found.27 The obvious response 
is that the law that ‘really’ matters will always be that which is actually 
operating and therefore being shaped locally. However, this risks being 
tautological. On the other hand, for others, including both critical legal 
scholars and some post-modern social theorists, law is even more tightly 
bound up with society than Ehrlich thought. It is state law, official law, 
which shapes society’s deepest conceptions quite as much as the reverse. 
Some speak here of law’s ‘constitutive’ role. In a recent discussion of intel-
lectual property law, for example, Rosemary Coombe and Jonathan Cohen 
argue that: 
… a critical cultural legal studies reveals that law is fully imbricated in shaping 
lifeworld activities, bestowing propriety powers, creating markets, establishing 
forms of cultural authority, constraining speech, and policing the public/private 
distinction (that protects corporate authors from social accountability).28
As they go on to say: 
Law is a palpable presence when people create their own alternative standards 
and sanctions governing the use of corporate properties in the moral economies 
that emerge in law’s shadows. 
Intellectual property law does not function in a rule-like fashion as a regime 
of rights and obligations, but also acts as ‘a generative condition and pro-
hibitive boundary for practices of political expression, public-sphere forma-
tion, and counter-public articulations of political aspiration’.29
For Ehrlich, the key to the unfolding of law was to be looked for in the 
role of associations. Amongst the many important developments of this idea 
may be noted Karl Renner’s demonstration—this time as seen from Vienna, 
rather than from the periphery—that codified property law could easily 
become no more than a dead husk in respect of the actual developments in 
26 D Nelken, above n 25; and D Nelken, ‘Changing Paradigms in the Sociology of Law’ in 
G Teubner (ed), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1987) 
191–217; D Nelken, Beyond the Study of Law in Context (Aldershot, Ashgate, forthcoming).
27 D Nelken, ‘Comparativists and Transferability’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), 
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) 437–66.
28 R Coombe with J Cohen, ‘The law and late modern culture: Reflections on “between 
facts and norms” from the perspective of critical legal studies’ (1999) 76 Denver University 
Law Review 1029 at 1031.
29 Ibid 1043.
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the actual organisation of capitalist firms or large rented tenements.30 From 
the 1950s onwards, the work of Lon Fuller at Harvard and Philip Selznick at 
Berkeley examined the roots of (and the need for) ‘legality’ within the struc-
ture of organisational life.31 The most recent studies by Lauren Edelman and 
her collaborators, also based in Berkeley, using the approach of institutional 
sociology to focus on the role of organisations, confirm Ehrlich’s ideas 
about the role of associations in creating the living law. On the other hand, 
they also show that official norms and those of the organisations themselves 
are (now) far more intertwined and interdependent than Ehrlich envisaged 
when first contrasting living law and ‘norms for decision’.
In one recent paper, which deals with organisationally constructed sym-
bols of compliance following the 1964 Civil Rights Act,32 Edelman et al 
coin the term ‘legal endogeneity’. This refers, they say, to ‘a subtle and 
powerful process through which institutionalized organizational practices 
and structures influence judicial conceptions of legality and compliance’. 
They argue that: 
… organizational structures such as grievance procedures, anti-harassment 
policies, evaluation procedures, and formal hiring procedures become symbolic 
indicia of compliance with civil rights law...as they become increasingly institu-
tionalized, judges begin to use their presence or absence in evaluating whether or 
not an organization discriminated. Ultimately, these structures become so closely 
associated with rationality and fairness that judges become less likely to scruti-
nize whether they in fact operate in a manner that promotes non-discriminatory 
treatment. 
As Rheinstein suggested, however, we should be careful before generalis-
ing too much from intellectual property law or anti-discrimination law. As 
Edelman et al themselves note, law-making that sets forth broad and often 
ambiguous principles gives organisations particularly wide latitude to con-
struct the meaning of compliance.
Law Without the State
The second approach to living law that we can trace back to Ehrlich is one 
less focused on how official law is shaped or reshaped, and more interested 
in uncovering the existence of legal regimes that do not have or appear to 
30 K Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Function (London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1949).
31 L Fuller and K Winston, The Principles of Social Order (Oxford, Hart, 2001); and 
P Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (New York, Russel Sage, 1968).
32 LB Edelman, LH Krieger, SR Eliason, C Albiston and VA Mellema, ‘When Organizations 
Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures’, 21 June 2006, 1st 
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper <http://ssrn.com/abstract=910940> 
accessed 24 July 2008.
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need the backing of the state. The key problem here is how to take into 
account the fact that there can (also) be non-state law and sub-state pri-
vate legal regimes. As Teubner puts it, for this literature, ‘law or not law 
is the question’.33 Although Gurvitch has stronger claims than Ehrlich to 
having developed a rich (even over rich) sociological theory of plural legal 
orders,34 discussions about legal pluralism often refer to Ehrlich’s writ-
ings and current debates continue to make explicit reference to his ideas. 
Unfortunately, however, many writers still tend to reduce Ehrlich’s contri-
bution to the importance he allegedly attributed to preserving ethnic and 
cultural pluralism. However, the varied examples of living law he offered, 
which included businessmen not insisting on claiming their debts, give the 
lie to such reductivism. 
Ehrlich famously argued that the state does not have a monopoly over the 
law. He would also have agreed with Llewellyn (who in fact was an admirer 
of his work) when the latter argued later that ‘law jobs’ do not have to be 
done by state institutions. Although Ehrlich focused mainly on the juris-
generative propensities of communities and associations, his writing has 
also rightly been taken as inspiration for those have gone on to argue, more 
broadly, that more or less autonomous ‘social fields’ can create their own 
set of norms and sanctioning mechanisms.35 The focus of more recent writ-
ing, however, is on the way in which globalisation is increasingly ‘uncou-
pling’ law from the state. Transnational enterprises and transnational forms 
of communication and regulation have thus emerged as an important new 
source of legal pluralism.
Two key examples of such new forms of legal pluralism which have 
provided the occasion for rediscovering Ehrlich’s ideas about living law 
are lex mercatoria, as discussed for example in Teubner’s collection Global 
Law without a State,36 and the governance of the internet, as in Rowland’s 
discussion of ‘Law in Cyberspace’.37 For these authors, as for many other 
commentators, the question of whether these regimes can be described as 
law is strongly linked to the issue of whether they should be so recognised 
(as if ‘calling’ them law will help make them so). And the answer is not 
necessarily the same for each of these examples. Whilst the first has to do 
more with norm-making by or for businessmen as an attempt to create 
33 G Teubner, ‘Foreword: Legal Regimes of Global Non-state actors’ in G Teubner (ed), 
Global Law without a State (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997) xiii.
34 G Gurvitch, Sociology of Law (London, Routledge Kegan Paul, 1947).
35 SF Moore, ‘The Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study’ (1973) 
7 Law & Society Review 719–46; and L Bernstein, ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: 
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal 
Studies 115.
36 Teubner, n 15 above.
37 D Rowland, ‘Cyberspace—A Contemporary Utopia?’ (1998) 3 The Journal of Information, 
Law and Technology <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1998_3/rowland> (last 
accessed 11 Aug 2008).
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interstitial order for their interests, the other has to do with an allegedly 
virtual space open to all. 
In a valuable article in which he examines both phenomena from the 
point of view of an expert on conflicts of law, Ralf Michaels compares them 
in relation to the different criteria that can be used for defining law.38 He 
accepts that both lex mercatoria and the internet can promote social order-
ing and social control. However, he claims that whilst the new law merchant 
also aims at dispute resolution, this is less clear with the internet. Moving to 
the structural criterion, law merchant imposes binding obligations on trades-
men, while the internet, he rightly suggests, ‘controls rather through its tech-
nology, its architecture’.39 Law merchant is referred to by some (although 
not all) participants as law; this again, is less true for the internet. Certainly, 
merchants consider themselves to be some kind of ‘community’; the same 
may be true of users of the internet. He concludes that while the new law 
merchant has a good claim to qualify as ‘law’ under most named criteria, pro-
ponents of an autonomous internet law have a more difficult case to make. 
Nonetheless, Michaels insists that, from a juristic perspective, neither of 
these regimes, nor any other legal system that can be shown to be only semi-
autonomous, can be rightly described as law. The crucial point for him is 
that they all require the state to ‘recognise’ their legal validity. The state has 
three ways to cope with other normative orders: incorporation, delegation 
and deference. Through incorporation, which applies, for example, to lex 
mercatoria, rules count as law only in so far as they become part of the law 
of the state. This, he argues: 
… is perfectly compatible with Ehrlich’s insight that the production of law mainly 
happens on the periphery, within society. Yet the insight loses its revolutionary 
potential. The state is able to domesticate this potentially subversive development 
through the incorporation of the norms that are created. It recognizes non-state 
communities as generators of norms, but it denies these norms the status of 
autonomous law. Instead, by incorporating these norms into state law, the state 
reiterates its own monopoly on the production of legal norms.40
Michaels also refers to Ehrlich’s arguments when discussing the strategy of 
deference. ‘(T)he state’, he explains: 
… may leave it to commercial practices and professional standards to develop 
the appropriate standard of care, the typical expectations necessary for interpret-
ing contracts, etc.41 This is the approach most frequently seen as an answer to 
Ehrlich’s ‘living law’. Again, living law is not ignored by the law of the state, but 
38 R Michaels, ‘The Re-Statement of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the 
Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism’ (2005) Duke Law school working papers series 
paper 21.
39 Ibid 18.
40 Ibid 28.
41 Ibid 24.
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neither is it recognized as law. The state and its law do not conceptualize their 
relation to such spaces of private ordering as a relation to foreign laws, to be 
handled by rules of conflict of laws. Rather, the state refrains from interfering, 
or, put differently, it defers to the private interactions of individuals. The whole 
public/private distinction, as we know well by know, takes place within the 
framework of the state’s law. Private ordering enters the substantive law of the 
state at the time of enforcement as fact—as customs, general expectations, etc, 
that must be taken into account in the application of the state’s laws, but that do 
not constitute such norms in themselves. 
Finally, Michaels tells us: 
A third operation, somewhat similar to deference, treats such orders as legal 
orders separate from the state’s own law, but still denies them full autonomy. 
This process can be called delegation. Instead of regulating on its own, the state 
defers to the self-regulation by interested groups. Examples of delegation abound. 
Autonomous labour agreements between unions and employers have the force of 
law; codes of conduct of regulated or unregulated industries substitute possible 
regulation by the state, etc. Indeed, this idea of the contract was one basis for the 
idea of the new law merchant (‘contrat sans loi’). In the very moment in which 
they are attached and subordinated to the state and its law ... Non-state law turns 
into sub-state law.42
Michaels is very wary of crediting ‘communities and fields with the power 
to create law’. However, he admits that his juristic perspective, one ‘intrin-
sic to operations of the legal system itself’, is not the only way to look at 
the question. ‘[L]egal pluralism, legal sociology and legal anthropology’, 
he explains, ‘may well have different definitions of law, because they are 
interested in different aspects of law’.43 Furthermore, for their part, even 
those sociologists and anthropologists most committed to the idea of legal 
pluralism will concede that the state does usually seek to deny the legiti-
macy of rival regimes. Michaels is quite willing to admit that, from a socio-
logical or anthropological perspective, it may (or may not) make sense to 
refer to all normative orders in communities as ‘law’. 
In fact, like legal scholars, social theorists are be found on both sides 
of the divide regarding whether we should describe rival or sub-state 
legal regimes as law. Legal scholars such as Berman (with whom Michaels 
polemicises) argue that communities have the power of ‘jurispersuasion’.44 
Anthropologists have been amongst those most convinced that state law 
is far too narrow a perspective for many of the societies they study.45 In a 
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid 30.
44 PS Berman, ‘From International Law to Law and Globalization’ (2005) 43 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 485.
45 For a strong statement, see F Von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Comment on Merry’ (1988) 22 Law & 
Society Review 897–902.
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provocative recent essay, Melissaris even extends the notion of communities 
to aggregates such as queues, arguing that: 
Only when the legal commitment of clubbers who queue patiently at a bouncer’s 
orders is treated as seriously as the legal commitment of communities with religious 
or other moral bonds will the pluralistic study of the law be able to move away from 
the essentially positivistic external study of groups to the study of legal discourses.46 
However, on the other hand, many would say this was a reductu ad absur-
dum.47 Social theorists such as Brian Tamanaha argue that what is crucial is 
the way in which people use the term ‘law’—which usually privileges state 
law.48 It has even been argued that extending the label ‘law’ to non-state 
regimes means imposing a state-like definition of law. For Simon Roberts: 
Law, long so garrulous about itself, is now, in its contemporary enlargement, 
graciously embracing others in its discourse, seeking to tell those others what 
they are.49
However, whether or not social scientists are entitled to use the term ‘law’ 
as they wish, a more important question concerns how far Ehrlich’s notion 
of living law helps or hinders our understanding of these emergent phenom-
ena. Take, for example, law-making by cyber communities. In a relatively 
early paper on this topic, which explicitly takes its inspiration from Ehrlich, 
Rowland makes an effort to tease out the living law of such communities. 
She argues that: 
… [the] impact of new communications technology on both social relationships 
and law-making processes is still in its infancy … [t]here are myriad political pro-
cesses at work in all societies but the decentralized nature of the Internet makes 
it particularly difficult to understand either the manner in which power can be 
exercised, by whom and within what limits. 
For her, we need to face the fact that cyber communities ‘challenge state-
based models of lawmaking as well as many of our preconceptions of the 
attributes of society and community’.50 
Rowland expresses concern about ‘imposing on the organization and use 
of the Internet a social construct which is entirely inappropriate both in 
idea and substance’. ‘Thus far’, she argues: 
… legal rules external to Cyberspace have not been conspicuously successful at 
regulating the global computer network … [and] … may only succeed in regulating 
46 E Melassaris, ‘The More the Merrier? A new take on Legal Pluralism’ (2004) 13 Social 
and Legal Studies 57–79 at 75. 
47 However, see the views of Reisman discussed in the next section.
48 BZ Tamanaha, ‘The Folly of the “Social Scientific” Concept of Legal Pluralism’ (1993) 
20 Journal of Law & Society 192; and BZ Tamanaha, ‘A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal 
Pluralism’ (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 296.
49 S Roberts, ‘Against Legal Pluralism’ (1998) 42 Journal of Legal Pluralism 95.
50 Rowland, n 37 above, 7.
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Cyberspace when the social conditions pertaining in cyber communities are 
acknowledged and understood. 
One can imagine Ehrlich sharing such cautions. At the same, however, she 
suggests, law may be forming itself ‘from below’. Legal rules, she tells us: 
… may already be emerging from amidst the chaos of Cyberspace ... in some 
respects the cyber community, at this juncture, could be regarded as a ‘pre-legal’ 
world and the change to a legal world will inevitably involve the creation of rules 
dealing with change, adjudication and recognition of rights. Most communities 
will regulate themselves, in practice, by a combination of formal or ‘book law’ 
(‘top-down’ rule formation) and also by acknowledgement of the customary rules 
which have evolved to supplement this source of law and to cater for what ‘actu-
ally happens’ (‘bottom-up’ regulation). Examples are the rites of passage, initia-
tion or induction for newcomers to that community which either enable them to 
integrate more easily, or, conversely, create a barrier to entry to the society which 
must be successfully negotiated.51
For Rowland, progress towards a self-regulating internet law is at best 
uneven. Although certain customs in cyber communities: 
… appear to be in the process of being elevated to the status of customary rules ... 
many rules remain purely customary, having no enforceable sanction attached 
to their non-adherence, indeed it is doubtful whether a universally enforceable 
 sanction can be applied in Cyberspace. 
Rowland concedes that we do not have to: 
… measure the success of custom as a regulatory mechanism purely by the avail-
ability of express sanctions. Successful customs may be obeyed, not so much 
because of the threat of sanctions, but for fear of standing out from the crowd. 
Such rules may be adhered to not out of personal conviction, but, rather, as an 
indication that such conduct is conventionally accepted and so participants are 
happy to accept it as a standard of assessment. People may also accept rules not 
necessarily because of any issue of morality but possible out of fear, self-interest, 
coercion or habit. 
Nonetheless: 
… what is not apparent in cyber communities is such an assurance of acceptable 
behaviour, at least as judged by the prevailing standards and mores of the physi-
cal world. In comparison, the range of norms and values in cyber communities 
seems to cover a much wider and more diverse range. What may be absent in 
the virtual world is the necessary degree of uniformity and unanimity defining 
a custom which has the capacity to metamorphose into a legal rule and become 
both binding and obligatory.52
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
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The literature on internet law has grown exponentially since Rowland 
posted her reflections (although it does not, as far as I am aware, make 
much reference to Ehrlich). The question of what norms are appropriate for 
cyberspace (and providing them with a history or legitimacy) has changed 
as the internet itself has developed from an idealised utopia of caring and 
sharing—with its folkloristic evolution of norms of good manners—to an 
ever-expanding site for commercial activities as well as the exploitation of 
the less attractive aspects of human sociability. It is less and less possible 
to think of users mainly in terms of online communities—and some of the 
communities that do exist in this space use the internet to disseminate hate 
propaganda aimed at others.53 However, net users continue to surprise. 
Pressed into service by the market, they can sometimes rise up against 
property rights as where users collectively reveal trade secrets. Seemingly 
feeble in the face of the armed might of the state, the diffusion of video 
photographs provides the evidence to protest at the conduct of military 
operatives and secret police from that in US military installations to police 
stations in Egypt. 
The internet is not a world apart. It belongs to and helps further those 
economic developments by which consumers (those who can afford to con-
sume) come more and more to play the role of producers. The real and vir-
tual worlds intersect as shown through the application of copyright law or 
privacy protections. The problems it throws up mirror many of the crimes 
and civil wrongs found in the real world. What goes on in the virtual world 
of ‘second life’ is all too reminiscent of what happens in ordinary life. The 
internet provides occasions for blogging feuds, cyber bullying, defamatory 
Google bombing, misuse of ‘spiders’ or cookies, and the all-too-evident 
spread of spamming. Enforcement of norms is complicated by the use of 
anonymity and the difficulty of knowing when users can be assumed to be 
informed of norm changes. On the other hand, sanctions from which there 
is no appeal, for example, where users are banishing users from given sites, 
may be considered too severe to be left to private parties. 
In so far as the internet does maintain a sort of autonomy, there is scope 
for more investigation into how far group exercises in rule making and 
rule application are constructing a distinctive form of living law. The col-
lective encyclopaedia Wikipedia, for example, does use law-like procedures 
for rule making and fact finding as ways of deciding whether an article’s 
content is sufficiently evidenced, whether links to other entries are justified, 
what counts as an insult, and so on. However, there is a need here too for 
protection from the guardians. In March 2007, for example, there were 
reports about a fake professor known as Essjay whose ‘authority’ to arbi-
trate disputes and remove site vandalism about articles on religion turned 
53 A Roversi, Hate on the Net (Aldershot, Ashgate Press, 2008). 
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out to be based on false credentials: he was obliged to resign from his role 
because, as the co-founder explained, the encyclopaedia relies on ‘trust and 
tolerance’. 
Order Without Law 
The third literature that can be connected to Ehrlich’s ideas about living 
law is one less interested in how associations impose their norms and 
more in how patterned behaviour gives rise to the working orders of asso-
ciations. Order, rather than law, is the focus here, as seen in such titles as 
Robert Ellickson’s celebrated Order without law—How neighbours settle 
disputes,54 or Eric Posner’s A theory of norms.55 The same is true even 
of Michael Reisman’s Law in Brief encounters—despite having law in its 
title.56 This line of enquiry can be distinguished from the previous literatures 
considered so far in so far as it refuses legal centralism not by contrasting 
the centre and the periphery or by hypothesising the existence of rival legal 
regimes, but by questioning the centrality of law as compared to norms. 
Writers seek to explain the origin and content of norms, in particular they 
develop theories of norms in the context of cooperation, collective solu-
tions and welfare maximisation. Even if not all writers on these topics take 
their cue from Ehrlich, at least some of this work can also be traced back 
to him. Especially relevant is his advice to move from studying conflict to 
understanding order, to distinguish situations ‘at war’ from those ‘at peace’, 
and to think about expectations as much as sanctions—or of expectations 
as sanctions. His controversial attempt to distinguish legal from other types 
of norms also shows him addressing these issues.
There is by now an enormous multi-disciplinary library—ranging across evo-
lutionary biology, psychology, philosophy, law, economics—and sociology—
which deals with the source and efficacy of norms. Sociology of law alone 
will not be able to master this subject. However, once Ehrlich’s ideas about 
living law are seen to embrace a wide range of normative phenomena, this 
leads to a richer set of questions than merely whether the norms of semi-
autonomous associations count as law. We are led to investigate the relation-
ship between law and norms. How and when do norms turn into law (as in 
the case of the internet or lex mercatoria)? How does law become normative? 
When do norms mandate not following or using law? How far do norms 
depend on associational life? How big or amorphous must such associations 
be? What about the fact that we are simultaneously members of very many 
associations? As this suggests, research on order without law tends to be 
54 R Ellickson, Order without law: How Neighbours settle disputes (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1991).
55 E Posner, Law and Social Norms (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000).
56 WM Reisman, Law in Brief Encounters (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999). 
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more radical than merely looking for ‘the law beyond the law’. Take, for 
example, Macaulay’s famous findings about the extent to which businessmen 
did not conduct their exchanges on the basis of contract law, relying instead 
on the shared norm of ‘keeping one’s promises’ and ‘standing behind your 
product’, which provide the underpinnings of normal business behaviour.57 
Those interested in norms would then want to go further and ask about the 
social origins of such norms and they way in which they are reproduced.
Whatever plausible links can be drawn between this sort of work and 
Ehrlich’s writings, in practice it can often be difficult to assess his actual 
influence. This can be well illustrated by considering the reference made by 
Ellickson to Ehrlich in his book, Order without law. Ellickson’s claim is 
that ‘impersonal norms are among the most magnificent of cultural achieve-
ments’.58 To understand them better, he sets out to synthesise insights from 
the sociology of law and economics and law. He criticises sociologists of 
law for treating the content of norms as exogenous and being too satisfied 
with thick descriptions rather than cumulative testable theory. He argues 
that we must learn what norms are, not just how they are transmitted. Law 
and economics writers, on the other hand, he sees as too obsessed with the 
relationship of norms to wealth maximisation and the problems of how 
groups can overcome the problem of ‘free riders’. Ellickson’s goal is to 
produce a ‘general theory of social control’, one that could predict, on the 
basis of independent variables describing society, the content of the society’s 
rules. These would in turn need to be distinguished as substantive, remedial, 
procedural and controller-selecting. 
In this book, however, he settles for the more modest aim of illustrat-
ing the logic of one social sub- system, that of ‘informal social control’. 
To develop his predictions, Ellickson draws on his own empirical study of 
rancher’s communities as well as historical research into dispute resolution 
in whaling communities. To explain the rationality of cooperation in the 
absence of law, he describes the details of dispute processing, the events 
that trigger sanctions, and how relevant information is gathered. What is 
of interest for us is that it is not until page 150 that he actually makes any 
reference to Ehrlich. At this point, he tells us blithely that ‘Ehrlich believed 
that law is relatively unimportant and that social forces tend to produce the 
same norms in all human society’.59 Ellickson then goes on to explain that 
Ehrlich (like Durkheim) is to be seen as a functionalist who saw the sanc-
tioning of norms as the way in which social groups maintained their soli-
darity. And he complains that functionalist arguments are circular because 
they do not say for which groups the function is being performed and 
assume that organisms have an objectively determinable state of health.
57 Macaulay, above n 19.
58 Ellickson, above n 54, 184.
59 Ibid 150, fn 62.
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Ellickson is not obliged to provide us with a rounded analysis of Ehrlich 
work. However, it is still surprising to find such a superficial reading coming 
from such an eminent scholar. Did Ehrlich really believe that ‘law is unim-
portant’? Ellickson just assumes that whatever Ehrlich is talking about it is 
not law, because he (along with many others) insists that state law is likely 
to be inefficacious unless backed up by other norms. However, it could 
as well be argued that by introducing the concept of ‘living law’, Ehrlich 
exaggerates the importance of law by finding it everywhere. Certainly, this 
is the interpretation favoured by those legal pluralists who take Ehrlich as 
a warrant for characterising rival normative schemes as law, to all effects. 
As far as the charge of functionalism is concerned, Ehrlich may indeed 
be interested in showing us how associations use law-like norms to solve 
problems of functioning and reproduction, but he also offers examples of 
behaviour, as for example where businessmen do not insist on collecting 
their debts, which go beyond this role. More fundamentally, his book also 
contains discussions of how norms reflect changing interests, which is the 
judges’ task to reconcile in the direction of progressive social change. 
Ellickson’s synthesis of economics and law and sociology of law leans 
towards a rational actor perspective. Most of the many other recent stud-
ies of norms tend to be even more influenced by the individualistic bias 
of economics of law and game theory. A recent study by Eric Posner, for 
example, also links norms to the question concerning the rationality of 
cooperation.60 Posner sees norms as rules that distinguish desirable from 
undesirable behaviour and give third parties authority to punish. He is 
particularly interested in showing how norms play a role in allowing actors 
to avoid dilemmas of non-cooperation by signalling their willingness to be 
reliable collaborators rather than act as free riders. He offers some valuable 
insights into how and when the following of norms can help participants 
distinguish genuine from false signals. He also discusses how law tries to 
harness the strength of norms and when legal regulation should or should 
not be used instead of relying on norms.
However, for all its plausibility, the claim that order relies more on shared 
norms than on official legal processes has also been criticised. In so far as 
Ellickson’s arguments are based on empirical research, they are open to 
counter-examples based on other case studies. Some research has shown that 
resort may be made to official law even in what would appear to be ideal 
conditions for maintaining order without law. Eric Feldman, an expert on 
Japanese law, has recently offered a fascinating and finely grained account 
of the workings of what he calls the tuna court in the Tokyo fish market.61 
Here, post-auction disputes between dealers and buyers, mainly regarding 
60 Posner, above n 55.
61 E Feldman, ‘The Tuna Court: Law and norms in the world’s premier fish market’ (2006) 94 
California Law Review: 2.
Ehrlich’s Legacies: Back to the Future in the Sociology of Law?  257
hidden defects in the fish, are routinely and expeditiously resolved by judges 
in ways that reinforce rather than substitute for the cooperation between 
the participants. Feldman claims that his case study goes against what 
Bernstein, Ellickson and others would predict, given that these participants 
form a community of continually interacting players who could be expected 
to create their own informal normative order. In Ehrlich’s language, we see 
here an illustration of the way in which ‘norms for decision’ can also guar-
antee peaceful co-existence. What is more, this preference for court-like 
procedures is found in a culture which many (though not Feldman himself) 
see as one normally geared to the avoidance of law. 
Ellickson’s work and, in general, the arguments of the so-called ‘new norms 
jurisprudence’, have also been subjected to more fundamental theoretical 
objections. As we have already noted in discussing ‘the law beyond the law’, it 
is also (increasingly) difficult to draw the line between sources of order within 
and outside a given setting. Even if it is not official law that produces order, 
there is likely to be some symbiosis between its projected order and the actual 
order shaped by and within the association or organisation. It can be a mistake 
to credit the idea that norms produce order independent of models in the larger 
environing framework. Mitchell, for example, has recently complained that: 
… there is little attention paid to the way in which group norms or private law 
systems relate to or are influenced by either legal, moral or customary norms 
that permeate the society as a whole … norms—whether the norms of the Elks 
Club, the New York Diamond Merchants Exchange, various religious groups, or 
the automobile insurance industry, are at some level inseparable from the web of 
norms that influences the behaviour of each of the members of these groups.62 
Mitchell proposes that we speak not of ‘order without law’, but ‘order 
within law’.63 As he says: 
The private law systems noted by Ellickson and Bernstein are grounded on the 
notion of legal obligation and legal order that pervades our society. Or, to put 
the claim more modestly, the legal systems which these private law systems mimic 
have been so pervasive in our society for so long that it seems unlikely that the 
new norms theorists can separate out the influence of the legal order upon the 
creation of private law norms.64 
Mitchell’s point is that official law serves as a model even when its details are 
unknown or misunderstood. ‘The problem with Ellickson’s work’, he says:
… is not the valuable field study but rather the conclusions he draws. Ellickson 
found what he took to be a startling conclusion. When neighbours had border 
62 LE Mitchell, ‘Understanding Norms’ (1999) 49 University of Toronto Law Review 
177–258 at 255.
63 Ibid 237.
64 Ibid.
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disputes or arguments over fences or over trespassing livestock; they didn’t sue 
each other—they negotiated out their difficulties in a way that—given the repeti-
tive nature of the issues—became regularized. This he viewed as the spontaneous 
generation of order and the irrelevance of law, supported by the fact that, when 
surveyed, most of his interviewees either didn’t know the governing law or got 
it wrong. 
Ellickson’s ranchers might not have known the law. They might have thought they 
knew the law but gotten its principles wrong. They might have made up their 
own rules to avoid litigation. But there is one thing that I am certain that they
did know; there was law, that law governed the kinds of disputes in which 
they engaged, and that law was available to them should they choose to use it 
(as sometimes they did). In other words, Ellickson’s ranchers were resolving their 
disputes on the broad background of an understanding of legal obligation that is 
immanent in our society and derives from the notion of a society governed by a 
system of laws—when one person causes damage to another’s person or property, 
there are circumstances under which the law (if invoked by lawsuit) will hold that 
party to account. The idea of legal order already existed in Shasta County—what 
Ellickson found that was different were the principles that were applied.65
The fact that the literature about norms is so vast also means that it is 
riven by almost as many disagreements as is the case for arguments about 
the nature of law. Differences in definitions, regarding, for example, how 
far norms should be seen more as instruments or as cultural constraints 
on action, tend to reproduce major divisions in sociological approaches to 
society. Others reflect the choice between privileging a more macro or micro 
focus on social life. Some efforts to locate the source of normative order 
go beyond the level of Ehrlich’s focus on associations or the interactions 
of people involved in repeated relationships. Michael Reisman, a leading 
professor of international law, claims to have discovered what he calls the 
micro-law of relatively fleeting relationships. In a series of well-observed 
descriptions, Reisman shows that people handle the problems of everyday 
life as if they were small-scale analogies of the larger problems of legal 
order.66 He explains how norms enable people to have a sense of what is 
and is not appropriate in situations such as those of looking at others, in 
talking with equals or with the boss, in making queues and holding places 
for others in line. Decisions about such matters cannot be and are not arbi-
trary or else such valuable institutions as the queue would break down.67
Although he entitles his book Law in brief encounters, what Reisman 
actually sets out to describe is (only) a form of de facto ‘living law’. He can-
not mean that the rules generated in these situations are already (official) 
65 Ibid 236.
66 However, it has been objected that the individuals Reisman discusses tend to be middle-
class people with middle-class responses.
67 Reisman, above n 56, 59.
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law because he goes on to ask when law should recognise or interfere in 
these micro-legal orders. In general, he is favour of keeping state bureau-
cracy out of such matters. However, (because of his background as an 
international lawyer?) he also suggests that there are some standards that 
micro-law must pass and ‘that the practices of all groups must be appraised 
in terms of the international code of human rights’ so that ‘practices 
inconsistent with the international standard be adjusted’.68As this suggests, 
though Reisman does not seek to anchor his insights in older writers, there 
are certainly many parallels with Ehrlich’s concerns. It is interesting too 
to find that Reisman insists that the norms he discusses are kept alive not 
so much by the sanctioning of breaches (albeit that this can and does take 
place), but by the decision of the norm-abider to reaffirm the existence of 
the norm despite the breach.
If authors such as Reisman emphasise the parallels between legal order 
and micro-order in society, others, such as Jutras, think it important to ask 
‘does the normative structure of everyday life mirror the architecture of 
official law?’69 They urge us to look for differences as well as similarities. It 
may be instructive, for example, that the everyday ‘feels’ non-legal, whilst 
the law appears self-contained. Tamanaha, too, considers it is an error to 
confuse legal and social order.70 It is important, he argues, to see that law 
is not necessarily a source of social order and social order is not necessarily 
law-like.71 This leads him to be ambivalent about Ehrlich’s claims concern-
ing normative order. 
In an important sense, Ehrlich’s observations raised a sharp critique of the mirror 
thesis and the social order function of law … In another important sense, however, 
Ehrlich’s work is the ultimate extension of the mirror thesis and the social order 
function of law. In effect his argument is that if positive law does not mirror social 
norms and does not in fact maintain social order, it has lost its superior entitlement 
to the claim of being the law, and the label must be given back, or at least shared 
with the ‘living law’, the actually lived social norms that do satisfy these criteria.72
Tamanaha argues that: 
The traditionally assumed relationship gets things precisely upside down. It is 
state law that is dependent on these other sources of social order if it is to have a 
chance of exerting an influence.73
68 Ibid 158.
69 D Jutras, ‘The legal dimensions of everyday life’ (2001) 16 Canada Journal of Law and 
Society 45–65.
70 BZ Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001).
71 I am relying on the thorough re-analysis in W Twining, ‘A Post-Westphalian Conception 
of Law’ (2003) 37 Law and Society Review 199–258.
72 Tamanaha, above n 70, 31.
73 Ibid 224.
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But, of course, this exactly takes us back to what it is that Ehrlich was 
trying to tell us!
RE-WRITING EHRLICH: FROM ‘LAW IN ACTION’ 
TO LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS
We have dealt so far with authors who use Ehrlich’s work as a precedent 
or inspiration without necessarily going into detail about what he actually 
wrote. In this section, I want to discuss more elaborate appropriations of 
Ehrlich, and show how they shape efforts to ‘go back to the beginning’ 
or ‘back to the future’ in the sociology of law. For a long time, there was 
a tendency (especially, but not only, in English-language discussions) to 
assimilate Ehrlich’s arguments to Anglo-American ways of talking about 
‘law in society’. This certainly facilitated drawing on him in dealing with 
socio-legal problems as they are posed in common law jurisdictions. This is 
most clearly seen in Pound’s original introduction to the first translation of 
Ehrlich’s Grundlegung.74 However, what we are now witnessing is in some 
respects an opposite trend, one which treats Ehrlich’s work as belonging 
to the world view of Continental legal systems and adopts him as a fore-
runner of one of the most advanced schools of continental sociology of 
law, that associated with Niklas Luhmann. Curiously, this re-presentation 
is again expounded in the introduction, this time to the new English trans-
lation of Ehrlich’s magnum opus.75 In this novel framing of Ehrlich’s ideas, 
we are told that Ehrlich represents an approach for which Luhmann’s 
sociology of law can be seen ‘the continuation’76 if not the sociological 
culmination. All of this even though Luhmann himself does not even refer 
to Ehrlich!
When I last wrote about Ehrlich, more than 20 years ago, my main 
goal was to set out the differences between his ideas and those of Pound. 
Ziegert (one of the few to appreciate the continuing relevance of this then 
half-forgotten pioneer) argued then that Pound’s distinctions between ‘law 
in books’ and ‘law in action’ ‘could only be’ that put forward by Ehrlich.77 
In my article, I claimed that, on the contrary, the ideas were different. In 
fact, even Pound himself, in a retrospective towards the end of his career, 
admitted that he had (as he put it) ‘developed’ living law into the somewhat 
74 R Pound, ‘Introduction to Ehrlich, E.’ in Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of 
Law, WL Moll (tr) (New York, Russell and Russell, 1936/62). Pound’s use of Ehrlich was 
endorsed by Alex Ziegert in his ‘The Sociology behind Eugen Ehrlich’s Sociology of Law’ 
(1979) 7 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 225.
75 KA Ziegert, ‘Introduction’ in E Ehrlich, The Fundamental Principles of Sociology of Law 
(New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2001) 19–44.
76 Ibid xxxi.
77 Zeigert, above n 74.
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different concept of ‘law in action’.78 Whilst acknowledging that there was 
some overlap between the concepts of ‘law in action’ and ‘living law’, I set 
out to show that Ehrlich’s original idea of living law should be considered 
a more promising and richer starting point for an approach more open to 
mainstream sociological concerns and less geared to the problem of legal 
effectiveness. 
I was convinced then of the overriding importance of correcting Pound’s 
misinterpretations: getting Ehrlich ‘right’ was the only way that his valuable 
insights could be recovered. I would still argue that Pound’s use of Ehrlich 
limits the potential contribution of the idea of living law. However, whilst it 
is good that more scholars (including Ziegert) have come to agree that it is 
important to recognise the differences between these two authors, I would 
now add that simply claiming that Pound got Ehrlich ‘wrong’ oversimplifies 
the issue of how classical authors are made relevant to contemporary prob-
lems. To a great extent, it is impossible to read a past author except through 
current lenses.79 What Pound took from Ehrlich can be seen as having spe-
cial relevance for his own time—and may be an interpretation that could 
still be salient in other times and places. Equally, alternative ‘readings’ have 
to ‘prove’ their superiority, now and in the future.
Ziegert in his new introduction aims both to present a faithful picture of 
Ehrlich and also to show that he is a forerunner of Luhmannian thinking. 
This leads to interesting, if sometimes surprising, reformulations. We are 
told that Ehrlich is the founder of the ‘genuine social level apart from the 
individual’. For Ehrlich, like Luhmann, in thinking about law, ‘expectations 
not sanctions matter’. What Ehrlich was trying to say in speaking of living 
law was that: 
… the norm structure in inner order of associations is what individuals need as a 
reference point to construct themselves as ‘behaving individuals’ and to expect from 
others what they can reasonably expect from themselves ... this reflexive domain 
is the domain of law and has nothing to do with the state governance [sic] or 
sovereignty.80
Likewise, the account of Ehrlich’s policy sympathies, although put in 
unfamiliar language, is not implausible. He is said to be against the self-
aggrandisement of lawyers and state functionaries, but to believe that 
‘society’ will keep these in check. Ehrlich, we are told, shows law’s ‘blind 
spot’ which results from the fact that law is ‘a trade’, and lawyers refer 
back only to legal practice and so don’t see what else is happening. In a few 
78 Pound, above n 74. In his introduction to Ehrlich’s book, he had already complained that 
‘Europeans had a phobia of the state’. However, he was living in the new deal United States 
of the 1930s, not as a citizen of strong—and soon to be totalitarian—European states.
79 HG Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, The Seabury Press, 1975).
80 Ziegert, above n 75, xii.
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cases though, Ziegert’s interpretations seem particularly forced ones. For 
Ehrlich, we are told: 
… [the] evolution of legal decision-making through legal practice conditions the 
social order for further evolution and specialises the court-based decision-making 
system as the effective hub of the living law. 
However, whilst it is fair to say that Ehrlich did admire the common law 
and the (somewhat idealised) way he assumed it operated, describing what 
courts do as ‘the hub of the living law’ seems a strange way of re-presenting 
a book that (pace Luhmann) sought to describe how living law was actually 
rooted in the everyday life of associations.
Arguably, Ziegert’s reformulations of Ehrlich also do a disservice to 
Luhmann by blurring the way in which his approach to socio-legal theoris-
ing has involved a ‘paradigm’ shift from ‘open system’ to ‘closed system’ 
theorising about law in society.81 On this point, Ziegert explains that 
‘Ehrlich does not deny the need for, or the fact of, legal specialisation 
(differentiation)’.82 However, ‘non denial’ is hardly the equivalent of the 
theoretical breakthrough which Luhmann builds on the back of his radical 
differentiation of legal and other communicative systems. Ziegert goes on 
to say that, for Ehrlich: 
What makes legal propositions legal is not a higher normativity but the spe-
cialised differentiated performance of a subject of social operations responding to 
pressures of uncertainty.83 
Here, too, it would seem more correct to say that, unlike Luhmann, Ehrlich 
mixes discussions of law and morals at the level of social pressures, but 
seeks to distinguish them in terms of the psychology of the individuals 
deciding whether to recognise their legitimacy.
The same applies when Ziegert tells us that, ‘like Luhmann, Ehrlich is a 
scientific observer of law in its social context’.84 Again, it would seem better 
to recognise that ‘context’ has more of a technical meaning for Luhmann, 
at least as explained by Teubner, his leading interpreter in legal sociology. 
Law makes its own context—and there are a series of contexts depending 
on what subsystem we start from. Likewise, when Ziegert affirms that, for 
Ehrlich, ‘[l]aw can never control the factual order itself’, we need to avoid 
confusing two senses of ‘control’. Ehrlich thinks that only a better informed 
form of legal decision making could—and should—do justice to the facts of 
the living law (this was his legacy to the American Legal Realists). However, 
for Luhmann, order comes from, or is imposed on the ‘noise’, of the outside 
world, and law’s role includes maintaining normative expectations by ‘not 
81 Nelken, above n 26.
82 Zigert, above n 75, xxxiii.
83 Zigert, ibid, xxiii.
84 Ibid xv.
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learning’ from the antinomian facts of social life. If Ehrlich’s message is that 
we must stop buying into jurists’ way of seeing the world, for Luhmann 
‘scientists’ must make a ‘second-order’ assessment of law’s way of observ-
ing the world—or as Teubner puts it, of ‘how the law thinks’.85
Although we should appreciate the effort to make Ehrlich speak to 
present concerns, we need also, I think, be cautious about assimilating 
him to conventional wisdom rather than using him to gain a perspective 
on it. Whereas Ziegert once told us that Ehrlich’s work could provide a 
valuable resource for improving efforts at social engineering,86 he now 
tells us that Ehrlich, like Luhmann, is sceptical about such efforts and 
that time has shown the sense of this scepticism.87 However, the current 
period is different from the early 1980s. An obsession with the limits of 
‘legal effectiveness’ can easily become a theoretical dead-end in a period 
where everyone assumes an instrumentalist role for law and exaggerates 
its ability to produce social change. However, matters may be different 
at a time where there is too much cynicism about law’s ability to deliver 
social progress. The same applies to the closely related research obsession 
with the so-called ‘gap’ between law’s promise and achievement.88 What is 
a tired approach within pragmatic, technically oriented, Anglo-American 
legal cultures may be much more heuristically useful in places, such as some 
continental European jurisdictions, where the ‘gap’ between legal promise 
and implementation is typically so wide that it is just taken for granted.89 
In such societies, filtering Ehrlich’s message through Luhmann’s formulas 
may be less innovative than it might otherwise seem.
However, all depends on what is done with these ideas. In this respect, it 
is interesting to contrast Ziegert’s re-presentation of Ehrlich with Gunther 
Teubner’s argument about ‘Global Bukowina’.90 Teubner, like Ziegert, is 
engaged in a rewriting of Ehrlich in Luhmannian terminology. However, 
whereas, for Ziegert, Ehrlich’s ideas were right when they were first put 
forward and (when properly reformulated) are still valuable now, Teubner, 
more surprisingly, argues that Ehrlich was actually wrong in his own time 
and only really comes into his own now at a time of globalisation. In addi-
tion, whereas both Ziegert and Teubner treat Ehrlich as a forerunner of the 
Luhmannian doxa, Teubner is explicit about the need also to change and 
‘update’ Ehrlich’s arguments. 
These differences are linked to the topics which these authors use Ehrlich 
to address. Ziegert is concerned with his relevance to law in the nation 
85 G Teubner, ‘How the Law Thinks’ (1989) 23 Law and Society Review 727–57.
86 Ziegert, above n 74.
87 Ziegert, above n 75.
88 D Nelken, ‘The gap problem in the sociology of law’ (1981) Windsor Yearbook of Aceess 
to Justice 35–62.
89 D Nelken, ‘Law’s Embrace’ (2001) 3 Social and Legal Studies 444–60.
90 Teubner, above n 15.
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state, the context Ehrlich was originally writing about. Teubner, on the 
other hand, in developing a highly original autopoietic excursus on global 
law, explores Ehrlich’s relevance in examining the role of law in the interna-
tional arena in exchanges mainly involving private actors—matters about 
which Ehrlich said little in his Grundlegung. According to Ziegert, Ehrlich 
is not to be understood primarily as concerned with legal pluralism. Indeed, 
he uses Luhmannian language to show how different elements of Ehrlich’s 
scheme of thought such as living law and norms for decisions are integrally 
related. Teubner, on the other hand, takes Ehrlich to be a forerunner in the 
study of legal pluralism, but gives this a very different meaning when re-
examined in the light of the Luhmannian theory of autopoiesis. 
Ziegert wants us to accept that Luhmannian insights can help get us to 
the heart of what Ehrlich was really trying to say. In assessing his interpreta-
tion, the question we need to ask ourselves is the relatively straightforward 
one of whether we find his reading Ehrlich convincing and suggestive. 
However, with Teubner, it is difficult to know how seriously he wants us 
to take his argument as an actual interpretation of Ehrlich. Does his use of 
the term ‘Global Bukowina’ represent a genuine effort to apply Ehrlich’s 
ideas to the new global context? Or is it no more (and no less) than a 
playful—and paradoxical—metaphor?91 After all, if everywhere is now 
a periphery, where is the centre? (Can there be only periphery?) What, if 
anything, is there in common between Ehrlich’s Bukovina and the world 
being remodelled by globalisation? Between a province waiting for ethnic 
nationalism and a world in which state borders lose meaning? On the one 
hand, Teubner’s audacious proposal that Bukovina has now gone global 
lays a direct challenge to those who say Ehrlich’s ideas necessarily relate 
to specific space and time conditions of a province in the defunct Austro-
Hapsburg empire. However, at the same time, the use of this phrase itself 
perpetuates the misconception that Ehrlich’s ideas get their sense from the 
(relative) lack of state presence in Bukovina. Ehrlich is seen as able to be 
relevant now (only) because we have a new situation of normative life 
again being formed beyond the reach of state. Yet it seems more faithful to 
Ehrlich to say that his arguments concerned the possibilities of normative 
life being formed outside of the state, even if not necessarily beyond its 
jurisdiction. 
In any case, Teubner is also quite explicit about what he sees as the need 
to correct and ‘develop’ Ehrlich’s ideas if we are to grasp the new form 
91 However, metaphors can be real in their effects. Bukovina in the Americas—the active 
website for those (overwhelmingly ethnic Germans) nostalgic about their roots in Bukovina—
describes features of life there in the past. But whilst it makes no mention of Ehrlich, some-
one has written in to ask what others think of Teubner’s paper on ‘Global Bukowina’. See 
D Nelken, ‘An e mail from Global Bukowina’ (2007) 3 International Journal of Law in 
Context 103–22. (And the Brazilian Professor in question has since got in touch with me).
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of global law beyond the state. This makes it difficult to decide how far 
Teubner’s ‘updating’ is intended to be true to what Ehrlich might himself 
have said if asked to theorise lex mercatoria. What evidence there is on this 
point does not go in Teubner’s favour.92 What is more clear is that Teubner 
finds Ehrlich convincing on some points even if he also sees the need for 
revisions. Thus he agrees with Ehrlich that the basis of law is in society 
and not in legal dogmatics—placing Ehrlich’s formulation of this truth as 
the head note of his paper. He also sees merit in the fact that, as he puts 
it, Ehrlich ‘asks where are norms actually produced and treats politics and 
social on equal footing’.93 There are also happy parallels in their endeav-
ours. Where Ehrlich’s idea of living law, as he says, ‘breaks a taboo’ that 
law must be identified with the state, so too does the idea that there can be 
a lex mercatoria independent from all nation states.
However, as with Ziegert, the process of translating Ehrlich’s ideas into 
the theoretical language of Luhmannian autopoietic theory can also make it 
difficult to know where Ehrlich ends and Luhmann begins. Most important, 
the source of living law for Teubner is not that hypothesised by Ehrlich. 
Teubner does not anchor this in the order of associations as such (except in 
so far as he sees law as ‘closely coupled’ with economic processes). Rather, 
he relies on the autopoietic theory of law which takes law to be one of a 
number of self-referring discursive sub-systems, each constructing their own 
environment. However, as we noted when discussing Ziegert’s recent work, 
this Luhmannian idea has no real trace in Ehrlich. Nor was Ehrlich, unlike 
Teubner, trying to explain how law in general or contract law in particular 
succeeds in keeping the paradoxes of its self- validation latent. If anything, 
he observed a lack of wider social validity of much state law.
Teubner talks about law being produced ‘at the boundary with eco-
nomic and technological processes’. He tells us that, likewise, according to 
Ehrlich, ‘living law is produced in the periphery of the legal system in close 
contact with the external social process of rule formation’. It is true that 
Ehrlich too suggested that economic development has and will transform 
law from within (the theme taken up later by Karl Renner).94 However, it 
is far from obvious that Ehrlich sees the distinction between the centre and 
the periphery as Teubner does. For example, his definition of ‘living law’ 
included lawyers’ contracts, which would have been a productive source 
of law even in imperial Vienna. What is more, the notion of periphery, as 
employed by Teubner, is ambiguous as between, on the one hand, Ehrlich’s 
92 Michaels (2005) quotes a little-known paper by Ehrlich concerning the history of private 
international law from which it seems likely that he would then have denied the status of law to 
lex mercatoria. On the other hand, we do not know what Ehrlich would say now and, on our 
interpretation, it is that which interests Teubner more than what Ehrlich actually said then.
93 Teubner, above n 15, 11.
94 Renner, above n 30.
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location in the province of Bukovina on the edges of the Austro-Hapsburg 
empire and, on the other, everyday life which is everywhere peripheral to 
what goes on in the courts.
Teubner’s focus is on the legal regimes created by and for global non-state 
actors by invisible social networks and invisible professional communities 
which transcend territorial boundaries. He sees these new forms of global 
law as growing up in a world characterised by a highly globalised economy 
and a weakly globalised politics. Even if Ehrlich’s own examples were 
domestic ones, many of the regimes Teubner wishes to analyse do come 
near to what Ehrlich meant by living law. Transnational contracting, arbi-
tration and the other processes of lex mercatoria could be so characterised, 
as could ‘intra organizational regulation in multinational companies’. It 
would also seem fair to assume that Ehrlich’s concept can be applied to 
‘all forms of rule making by private governments’ and ‘professional rule 
production’, although it should also be noted that Ehrlich’s interest was less 
in rule making as such and more in the way in which such rule systems are 
actually applied in practice.
On the other hand, Teubner’s example of ‘technical standardization’ as 
an instance of living law has a more dubious pedigree. The whole phenom-
ena of so-called ‘bureaucratic administrative law’95 seems far from Ehrlich’s 
concerns, and his account of living law gives little indication that he realised 
that a form of normativity based on technical standards and conventions 
would become so important. Even Teubner’s example of human rights 
law is not a straightforward case of living law. Much human rights law is 
actually promoted or underwritten by state or international law. Even if 
non-state actors such as NGOs, etc play a crucial activist role, it still seems 
crucial to recognise the extent to which these associations are making rules 
for others,96 not, as in Ehrlich’s account, only for their own members. As 
far as these two key elements of global law are concerned, the idea of living 
law may obscure more than it reveals about them. 
Why then bring Ehrlich into it, given that he had little to say about such 
transnational legal regimes? Teubner arrives there by a process of elimina-
tion. We cannot, he says, understand legal globalisation via political theo-
ries, there is no world constitution to ‘structurally couple’ law and politics: 
these legal regimes are governed less by international courts or worldwide 
legislation than by multinational law firms. So Ehrlich’s ‘living law’ is the 
best candidate for describing how the globalisation of law ‘creates a multi-
tude of de-centred law making processes in various sectors of civil society 
95 D Nelken, ‘Is there a crisis in law and legal ideology?’ (1982) Journal of Law and Society 
177–89.
96 D Nelken, ‘Signaling Conformity: Changing Norms in Japan and China’ (2006) 27 
Michigan JIL 933–72.
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independently of national states’.97 On the other hand, the way in which 
Ehrlich himself characterised living law in Bukovina will not as such suffice 
for understanding these new forms of global living law. Teubner, therefore, 
draws a strong contrast between the sense of Ehrlich’s arguments in their 
time and place, and the updating of his ideas for today’s world. 
As against Ehrlich’s idea of living law, Teubner advises, law is ‘not draw-
ing its strength now from ethnic communities as the old living law was 
supposed to do’.98 ‘Ehrlich’, Teubner goes on, ‘was of course romanticiz-
ing the law-creating role of customs, habits and practices in small-scale 
rural communities’. The global world, by contrast, relies on ‘cold  technical 
processes not on warm communal bonds’. However, the assumption that 
Ehrlich is putting forward a thesis of legal pluralism rooted in ethnic 
communities—even if Teubner is certainly not the only commentator to 
take such a line—rests on a tendentious interpretation which has poor sup-
port in the text itself. This way of reading Ehrlich also displays the genetic 
fallacy by confusing factors that may have helped give rise to his argument, 
with the substance and validity of his ideas themselves. In fact, Ehrlich’s 
claims were intended to be potentially universalisable ones, applicable well 
beyond Bukovina, and had less to do with ethnic differences than with the 
way in which laws, like norms, are created through the life of ‘associations’. 
This helps to explain why the question of ethnic pluralism was not the main 
issue for early critics of Ehrlich such as Kelsen, whose objection was more 
to Ehrlich linking law to the actual normative practices of groups even 
when these were inconsistent with the Austrian code. 
Teubner’s revisions go much further, however. For him, the problem with 
applying Ehrlich’s ideas is not merely the non-universability of the contin-
gencies of ethnic pluralism in Bukovina. It is the link between the law and 
people’s social experiences which needs to be broken if we are to under-
stand how law reproduces itself. We must recognise that ‘the lifeworld of 
different groups and communities is not the principal source of global law’. 
Instead, he argues, we should shift: 
… from groups and communities to discourses and communicative networks, the 
proto law of specialized organisational and functional networks nourished not by 
stores of tradition but from the ongoing self-reproduction of highly specialized 
and often formally organized and rather narrowly defined global networks of an 
economic, cultural, academic or technological nature. 
97 Teubner, above n 15, xiii.
98 The formulation of this sentence is somewhat ambiguous and it is therefore not entirely 
clear whether Teubner himself totally endorses this account of Ehrlich’s ideas. Does ‘supposed 
to do’ here mean ‘as commonly thought’? However, then, if Teubner knows better, why does he 
makes it seem as if this does represent Ehrlich’s views? Or does ‘supposed to do’ mean what liv-
ing law ‘should’ reflect the different laws of ethnic communities? This would be a different claim 
having less to do with where law comes from than with the need to recognise cultural diversity.
268   David Nelken
Teubner inserts Ehrlich’s ideas into what he (unlike Ziegert) acknowledges 
to be a new and unfamiliar framework. We must, he argues, replace: 
… rule, sanction and social control with speech acts, coding transformation of 
differences and paradox. It is not rules but communicative events that should 
be our focus and it is the self-organising process of rules that is important in 
understanding the symbolic reality of legal validity, not the possibility of impos-
ing sanctions.99
However, at the same time, he suggests that it is only if we make this move 
towards autopoiesis theory that we can come to discover how, in some 
respects, Ehrlich’s approach is now more valid than it was in the past. As 
he puts it: 
… although Eugen Ehrlich’s theory turned out to be wrong for the national law 
of Austria, I believe that it will turn out to be right, both empirically and norma-
tively, for the newly emerging global law.100
Once again, however, such striking arguments need to be carefully 
unpacked. In what sense does the truth of Ehrlich’s (many) ideas depend on 
what happened in the past or on what the future brings? Should scientific 
claims be judged in the light of historical events? What exactly is Teubner 
referring to when he asserts that Ehrlich ‘turned out’ to be ‘wrong’? This 
cannot, for example, include his claims about the centre of gravity of law 
being in society since Teubner takes this as his starting point. Have Ehrlich’s 
ideas about living law been discredited? Must we really go beyond the 
boundaries of state law in order to find merit in Ehrlich’s theses? When 
exactly did Ehrlich’s theory ‘turn out to be wrong’? When the First World 
War caused the Austrian empire to collapse? Or when he was forced to 
teach in Rumanian in the last years of his life (before the Nazis and com-
munists then tried to cancel his memory)? Arguably, the rise of ethnic 
nationalism could actually prove Ehrlich’s point about the importance of 
more local loyalties rather than those to the imperial state (and it is strange 
for Teubner to call the law of the Austro-Hungarian empire ‘the national 
law of Austria’). 
What evidence, on the other hand, does Teubner have that Ehrlich will 
eventually turn out to be right? Even if we choose to look beyond state 
law, it is not obvious why the growth of lex mercatoria proves Ehrlich to 
be ‘right’. It certainly shows that there can be forms of normative ordering 
that some call law, even though they are not based on state recognition. 
However, Ehrlich was not mainly concerned with whether normative order-
ings were (already) actually called law, but with whether scientific observers 
had reasons to call them law. And there are, of course, with due respect to 
 99 Teubner, above n 15, 13.
100 Ibid 3.
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Teubner, still many who argue that lex mercatoria is not really law what-
ever it is called. Even though Teubner tells us that Ehrlich has been proven 
right through having ‘predicted’ the rise of non-state global law, he himself 
asserts that it is only a question of time before these new forms of global 
law will be, as he says, ‘re-politicized’ (although admittedly he considers 
that this will not take place through traditional political institutions, but 
via ‘structural coupling’ with specialised discourses). Once this takes place, 
would this mean that Ehrlich will again have ‘turned out ‘to be wrong’? Is 
his a thesis that only works for periods of transition—for interstitial times 
as well as places? 
CONCLUSION: INTERPRETATION AS APPROPRIATION
In this review of Ehrlich’s legacies—the way in which his work has influ-
enced and been taken up by later scholars—we have sought to provide 
examples of inquiries inspired by Ehrlich’s ideas as well as efforts to revi-
talise his work. We have shown the difficulty of maintaining any simple dis-
tinction between efforts to place Ehrlich’s work in its context and attempts 
to get it out of its context, and suggested that a degree of ‘rewriting’ forms 
an important part of re-contextualising projects whether these be carried 
out by Pound, Ziegert or Teubner. Once we accept that interpretation is a 
form of appropriation, it becomes more difficult (although not impossible) 
to distinguish between the appropriation and misappropriation of a previ-
ous writer’s ideas. 
For the purpose of tracing Ehrlich’s legacy, it makes sense to ask first 
of all how far Teubner is faithful to Ehrlich. However, we should not be 
surprised if Teubner’s account of what is right and wrong about Ehrlich’s 
arguments tells us at least as much about Teubner—and his desire to show 
the value of the autopoietic approach to law and society—as it does about 
Ehrlich. Any discussion of Teubner on Ehrlich which is only interested in 
Ehrlich is therefore going to miss the point of what Teubner is doing. We 
are dealing with an author who has openly chosen to ‘use’ Ehrlich as a 
pretext to introduce a series of papers about non-state law. Therefore, the 
more pertinent question here, as in other cases of appropriation, is to ask 
how far Teubner’s reading of Ehrlich’s work has helped him to throw new 
light on lex mercatoria.
Teubner begins his paper by contrasting a top-down political global order 
based on American policing (he refers to Clinton’s ‘humanitarian’ peace-
keeping) to one constructed by means of an Ehrlich-type bottom-up ‘peace-
ful’ legal order. The latter, which he sees as more important, he equates with 
a range of developments in global non-state law. As it happens, after 9/11 
things have ‘turned out’ differently with respect of the extent of American 
military engagements than Teubner or anyone else could have anticipated. 
270   David Nelken
However, we can also question whether Global Bukowina really represents 
the alternative to the imposed Pax Americana that Teubner claims it does. 
Is lex mercatoria, for example, actually emancipated from politics—or is 
it precisely political by pretending not to be so? It is after all the genius 
of the common law that it ‘appears’ to be more geared to bottom-up eco-
nomic necessities than top-down political projects. Hence the growth of 
lex mercatoria can be seen as helping to promote American ideas about the 
relationship between state and market and spread ways of doing law which 
privilege the symbolic capital of their professional elites.101
What of the political and practical implications of Teubner’s rewriting of 
Ehrlich? As is not uncommon in his writings, Teubner deliberately blurs the 
line between describing and advocating.102 Here he argues that lex merca-
toria should be legally recognised for what it is, the prototype of non-state 
law that is inevitably replacing that of the nation state. As against this, Ralf 
Michaels, for example, has recently insisted that: 
… instead of moving the state to the periphery of our analyses and thereby ignor-
ing its importance for our problems, we should move it into the center of our 
analysis, so we can critique its role in globalization. 
According to him: 
… if we want to emancipate non-state law vis-à-vis the state, then it is not enough 
to look at the requirements on the side of non-state law. We must also look at 
what is necessary on the side of the state to make such emancipation possible. 
And we must ask what kind of emancipation this will be.103
For Michaels: 
The simple idea that because globalization brings about a plurality of legal orders 
the state should recognize all these orders as law is either too radical or not radi-
cal enough. The idea is too radical if it expects the state to do things that run 
counter to what the state, as it exists right now, is about. In a nutshell, the state 
will always react as state to the challenges of globalization, including the chal-
lenge from non-state communities and their laws. The idea is not radical enough 
if it believes that such a change could be brought about without changing the role 
of the state. In order to overcome the state-focus of conflict of laws, we must, 
ultimately, overcome the state itself. Ultimately, by acknowledging the right of 
everyone to make law, we accept that no one has the right to make law anymore. 
If everyone is able to claim jurisdiction, no one will have a superior position to 
mediate between conflicting regulations of conflicting communities anymore, at 
least not from a superior basis.104
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If Teubner is entitled to appropriate Ehrlich for his purposes, the same 
applies to those who have in turn been stimulated by Teubner’s ideas. Some 
of these writers have in fact gone on to develop his creative ‘reworking’ 
of Ehrlich in unexpected directions. Whilst Teubner himself counterposed 
Global Bukowina to the idea of a global political government, Thomas 
Mathiesen, for example, takes Teubner’s idea and uses it to chart the 
recent growth of a global control system, what he describes as a menac-
ing ‘lex vigilatoria’ of surveillance removed from the political control of 
individual nation-states.105 According to Mathiesen, the signs of this global 
control without a state may be seen in the ties between, for example, the 
SIRENE exchange, Eurodac, communication control through retention 
and tapping of telecommunications traffic data, the spy system Echelon, 
and so on. Mathiesen’s account shares with Teubner’s a focus on the way 
in which legal regimes are becoming increasingly untied or ‘de-coupled’ (to 
use Teubner’s term) from nation-states, but the idea of imposed interna-
tional normative order represented here is a far cry from that described by 
Teubner—or for that matter by Ehrlich. 
As we see, Mathiesen cites Teubner on Global Bukowina in order to 
make an argument that he would probably not recognise. However, other 
authors offer even more contestable interpretations of Teubner on Ehrlich. 
In an original discussion of the spread of transgenic technologies through 
‘timespace’, Paul Street draws on the disciplinary resources of critical 
human geography, post- structuralism and actor network theory. His aim in 
large part is to show how new developments are challenging the boundaries 
of existing academic disciplines. Thus he describes modes of ordering that 
weave together legal and other normative systems through what are made 
to seem inanimate material technologies. For these technologies to flourish, 
he argues, a range of interrelationships must occur that cut across social 
and legal boundaries and mobilise farmers, government departments, texts, 
individuals, international organisations, corporations, non-governmental 
organisations, lawyers, as well as the seeds themselves and a host of other 
‘actants’ (as Latour describes them). Law in the form of intellectual property 
rights plays a special role in bringing together dispersed actors in poly-
morphic social networks and maintaining the meaning of biotechnologies 
through time and space so as to enrol farmers into social networks neces-
sary for the purposes of producers.
In the course of developing his argument, Street takes aim at Luhmann, 
who, he alleges, denies that ‘law comes out of the social’. He likewise criti-
cises Teubner for his ‘attempt to give law an autonomy beyond society’.106 
105 T Mathiesen, ‘Lex Vigilatoria—Towards a control system without a state?’, Essays for 
civil liberties and democracy, European Civil Liberties Network (2005).
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His case study, he says, shows rather that all law is always social and that 
there is no ‘global law’. Specific companies invent genetically modified seeds, 
and use text objects, private policing and copyright law with the help of the 
state so as to enforce their vision of the facts about seeds and the appropri-
ateness of exploiting their property rights. In the end, even (even?) Ehrlich is 
seen to have got things wrong. Street concludes his article saying that: 
… only through examining the particular practices and processes can we glimpse 
the performative power not of law itself, but of those networks that success-
fully manage to mobilise law. For law to be successful it must in one sense be 
living law. It must be a law that exists beyond the proclamations and practices 
of lawyers and the state. But this is not Ehrlich’s conception of living law. While 
it is a law that dominates life itself it is a law that lives within, and a law that 
leads to convergent habitual behaviour, but only for so long as it continues to be 
mobilized.107
Unlike Teubner, therefore, who tries to anchor his concept of Global 
Bukowina in Ehrlich’s pioneering scholarship, Street prefers to emphasise 
how new developments require a radical new way of thinking, starting 
from scratch. It is not entirely clear what Street finds lacking in Ehrlich’s 
approach—his exegesis of what Ehrlich wrote is even more tangential to 
the real point of his paper than Teubner’s use of him. But let us assume, for 
argument’s sake, that Street is right to say that what he is describing does 
not correspond to what Ehrlich was talking about when he introduced the 
concept of ‘living law’. It would be all too easy to explain this by saying 
that Ehrlich did not really anticipate the developments described by Street. 
With due respect to Ziegert and Teubner, we could also wonder why anyone 
should have expected him to. On the other hand, matters are different if, 
like them, we are interested not only in what Ehrlich once meant, but also 
in what Ehrlich means now. In that case, we could argue that his legacy 
includes all that his work has inspired, including efforts to go beyond him.
107 Ibid 28.
